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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Capstar Radio Operating Company ("Capstar") is the owner of a parcel of property 
located in tile Southwest Quarter ofSectioi122, Township 50 North, Range 5 West Boise 
Meridian, located in ICootenai County, Idaho. Defendants Doug and Brenda Lawrence, 
husband and wife ("Lawrence"), are the owners of a parcel of property located in the Southeast 
Quarter of Section 21, Towtlsliip 50 North, Range 5 West Boise Meridian, located in Kootenai 
County, Idaho. At the time Lawre~lce acquired their parcel, there existed an unimproved road 
over, through and across the Lawrence parcel (R p. 01 1,  paragraph V; R p. 021, paragraph 5.) 
Capstar filed a complaint November 7,2002 seeking ingress and egress to their property under 
four alternative tlleories: express easement; i~nplied easement; prescriptive easement; and/or an 
easement by necessity, and seelting ail order of the trial court enjoining Lawrence from 
interfering with Capstar's or its tenant's right of use d t h e  unilnproved road for access to its 
parcel. 
B. Course of the Proceedings 
This matter has previo~isly bee11 on appeal before this Court in Ccrpsmr Radio 
Operaling Co. I). Ln~lrence, 143 Idaho 704, 709, 152 1'.3d 575, 580 (2007) ("Capstar P') 
seelting reversal of the district court's grant of summary judgment finding an express easement 
across Lawrei~ce's property. This court vacated the sumlnary judgment and remanded the 
matter back to the district court for further proceedings. A relnittitur was filed March 30, 2007. 
Followillg remand, on May 14,2007, Capstar renewed its summary judgment motioil 
on its remaining easerllent theories. Supp R Vol. I, pp. 7-8. ' On May 31, 2007, Lawrence filed 
for a iilotion for an enlargement of time to August 15,2007 to respo~id to the inotion for 
surnlnary jr~dglnent because Lawrence required additio~lal time to c o ~ l d ~ ~ c t  discovery in 
response lo the iilotion for suninlary judgment. Supp R Vol I, pp. 023-025. 
On June 6,2007, Lawrence's couiisel filed a rnotioil to disqrraiify the district court 
judge for cause and an applicatioii for an order shortening tiiiie to have the lnatter heard on the 
same date scheduled ihr tlie suin~nary judgment hearing. Supp R Voi. 1, p. 049-54. Capstar did 
not object to the request to shorten tiine and the court heard the motioii to disqualify for cause 
on June 13, 2007. Beca~~se  the lilotion to disqualify divested tlie trial court ofjririsdiction to 
hear other motio~ls, the motion for sunnnary judg~nent did not proceed as sclieduied. Supp Tr 
p. 4, p. 5. On June 25, 2007, the trial court issued a written decision denying the  nol lion for 
disqualification for cause. Supp R Vol I, pp. 066-091. A~notioii to reconsider was filed July 9, 
2007, as well as ~notioii for perinissio~i to appeal. Supp R Vol. I, p. 92-93. AII order deiiyiiig 
this liiotioil was entered august 7, 2007. Supp R Vol. 11, p 338-339. 
011 July 24, 2007, Lawreiice filed another motion for el~largeliieiit of tinie to November 
1,2007 to respond to Capstar's inotion for sumiiiary judgment, again iildicatiilg additional time 
was required to conduct discovery. Supp R Vol. I, pp. 127-129. The motion was heard August 
I The Clerk's Record on Appeal in Docket No. 35120 was ordered prepared as a supplemental record. Althougl? 
not designated as a si~ppleme~ital record by the clerk, to avoid conriision with t l ~ c  Clerk's Record in Docket 32090, 
the record following rema~id and pi-epared for Docket No. 35120 will be rererred to a Si~pp R in this brief 
7, 2007. The trial court granted the motion for e~llargement of time and contin~ied the summary 
,judgmeilt hearing. 
On November 27, 2007, the trial court again heard 1,awrence's renewed niotion to 
appeal the trial court's denial of Lawrence's motion for ail interlocutory appeal of the denial of 
the motion to disqualify the trial judge for cause. Supp T r  p. 133. The summary judgment was 
heard November 28,2007. Tlie trial court denied the motion to proceed with an interlocutory 
appeal on Noveiuber 30,2007. Supp R Vol. 111, pp. 548-552. 
On December 17, 2007, Lawrence filed a "Motion for Permissive Appeal" with this 
Court. The motion was denied by this Court January 17, 2008. Supp R Vol. 11, p. 343-344; 
Voi. TI, pp 553-554.. 
The District Court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment 011 February 6, 2008. This appeal followed. 
C. Stateme~~t of Facts 
In their statelnent of the facts, Lawrence discussed a conditioilal use permit granted to 
Nextel Communications. This conditio~ial use perniit is unrelated to Capstar or its parcel of 
property. Capstar submits that the relevant facts to the issues on appeal are those set forth 
hereafter. 
In 1968, Pilie and Agnes Rey~iolds sold Edward and Colleen Raden and Harold and 
Viola Marcoe several parcels of property, including the Southeast Quarter of Section 21, 
Township 50 North, Range 5 West Boise Meridian, located in ICooteiiai County, Idaho and tile 
adjacent So~itliwest Quarter oE Section 22, Tow~lship 50 North, Range 5 West Boise Meridian, 
located in Icootenai County, Idaho except for a one acre parcel which had previously been 
conveyed to General Telephone Company ("GTC"), subject to easements granted to GTC over 
and across the Southwest Quarter of Section 22 and the Southeast Quarter of Section 21. 
Appeal Exhibit Weeks Affidavit, exhibit "A". 
In 1969, Harold and Marlene Funk ("Funk") entered into a purchase agreement with 
Edward and Colleen Raden and Harold and Viola Marcoe which included a sale of the 
Southeast Quarter of Section 21, Township 50 North, Range 5 West Boise Meridian, located in 
ICootenai County, Idaho (hereafter "Section 21 ") and the adjacent Southwest Quarter of Sectio~l 
22, Township 50 North, Range 5 West Boise Meridian, located in Kootenai County, Idaho 
except for the one acre parcel which had previously been conveyed to General Telephone 
Company in 1966 (hereafter "Section 22") and s~ibject o the GTC access easement. Appeal 
Exhibit Weclts Affidavit, exhibit "B"; R p. 035. A subsequent 1974 warranty deed from 
Raden Raden and Marcoe to F~lnlt conveyed the Section 21 and Section 22 property subject to 
easements of record. Appeal Exhibit Weelts Affidavit, exhibit "C". At the times Funlcs 
purchased the property in 1969, the GTC easement road was the only existing road providing 
access to the Funit's real property. R. p. 036. 
When Pilcc and Agnes Reynolds granted GTC its parcel in 1966 in Section 22, they 
included in the deed an easernent over and across the Southwest Quarter of  Section 22 and the 
Southeast Quarter of Section 21, Township 50 North, Range 5 West Boise Meridian, Icootenai 
County, Idaho. Appeal Exhibit Weeits Affidavit, exhibits "V" and "FF" (Exhibit A to Wenlter 
Affidavit). GTC also obtained an easement from Glen and Ethel Blossorn, husband and wife 
,over the Southwest Qrrarter of Sectioil 21, Township 50 North, Range 5 West Boise Meridian, 
Kootenai County, Idaho. Appeal Exhibit Weeks Afiidavit, exhibits "V" and "1°F" (Exhibit B to 
Welllter Affidavit). GTC also obtained an easement for ingress and egress to its parcel across 
the North Half of the Northeast Quarter of Section 28. Appeal Exhibit Weelts Affidavit, 
exhibit "X". Thus, GTC had recorded easements over the entire easement road to its parcel. 
In 1972, Funk purchased an easement from Wilbur Mead to cross his property in the 
Southwest Quarter of Section 21. R Vol. 11, pp. 367-368 (Tr p. 43, L1. 22-25; p. 44; p. 45, p 
46, Ll.); Appeal Exhibit Lawrence Affidavit, exhibit "F" . There was a gate on Mead's 
property. The gate was loclied. In 1992, GTE sent Funk a new ltey to the gate on the Mead 
property. R Vol. 11, p. 363, LI. 9-25) 
In 1975, Funk segregated and sold the Lawrence parcel to Human Synergistics, Inc. a 
Minnesota corporation. The sale was evidenced by a recorded Sale Agreement. This 
agreement indicated that the sale was subject to and including ingress egress easement over this 
and adjoining property in said sectioils 23 and 22 owned by Ft~nli. Appeal Exhibit Weelts 
Affidavit, exhibit "E". I11 1977, a Meinorandi~m olContract was recorded evidencing the sale 
of the Lawrence parcel to Don and Fern Johnstoi~, husband and wife, and Jollil and Mary Ann 
McIHugh, husband and wife. Appeal Exhibit Weelts Affidavit, exhibit "F", In 1987, a 
Memorandum of Sale Agreement was recorded evideilcillg the sale of tlie Lawrence parcel to 
National Associated Properties, Iilc. Appea1 Exhibit Weelts Affidavit, exhibit "G". In June 
1996, National Associated Properties, Inc. conveyed tlie Lawrence parcel to Arlnan and Mary 
Jane Farmanian, husband and wife. Appeal Exhibit Weelts Affidavit, exhibits J and I<. A 
Memorandum of Sale Agreement between Arnian and Mary Jane Farmanian and Lawrence was 
recorded October 1, 1996. Appeal Exhibit Weelts Affidavit, exhibit "L". A warranty deed for 
this transfer was recorded August 27, 1998. Appeal Exl~ibit Weeks Affidavit; exhibit "P". 
Doug Lawrence provided a depiction of the access road in a deposition taken in 
litigation with Verizon Nortllwest (GTC's successor in interest) which he testified further 
defined the easement that was granted to GTC in 1966, and was apparently a portrayal of the 
road prepared in 1967 by GTC as a detail of the access road to its parcel. Appeal Exhibit 
Weelts Affidavit, exhibit "Y" and Exhibit 15 attached to Exhibit "Y". Exhibit 15 portrayed the 
GTC road as coi~linencing at a county road and passing in northeasterly direction through 
Section 21, then taliing a sharp turn southeasterly into Section 28, then changing direction to 
the northeast again and entering Section 21 again for a short distance and continuing generally 
in a northeasterly direction through Section 22 to its terniinus at a tower site. A recorded 
survey of a portion of the access as it existed over and across Section 28 and the Southeast 
Quarter of Section 21 was placed in the record which was consistent with the depiction of the 
GTC easement road offered by Lawrence in his deposition. Appeal Exhibit Weelts Affidavit, 
exhibit "2". This road was depicted by GTC's successor in interest, Verizoil Northwest, Inc., 
on a U.S. Geological Survey Map as comliiencing at the public road (identified on the U.S. 
Geological Survey map as "Slti Lodge Road") and traversing across the Southwest Quarter of 
Sectioil21, tile11 traversing over and across into the East Half of the Northeast Quarter of 
Sectiotl 28; then passing tllrough the Lawrence parcel; and terminating in the Southwest 
Quarter of Sectioll 22 at ail area identified on the U.S. Geological Survey map as "Radio 
Tower" ail Blossom Mountain. Appeal Exhibit Weelts Affidavit, exhibit "FF" (Exhibit C to 
We~llcer Affidavit). This depiction was very similar to Lawrence's depiction of the road in 
course, direction and configuration of the road, and the sections over and across which it 
passed. 
In 1989, Funk segregated and sold the Capstar parcel to ICootenai Broadcasting, Inc 
("I<Brn). John Rook was the president of I<BI. Appeal Exhibit Weelts Affidavit, exhibits " Q  
and "R", R p. 027. In October 1993, as part of a banltruptcy proceeding, a quit claim deed 
conveyed ICBI's interest to Rook Broadcasti~lg of Idaho, Inc. Appeal Exhibit Weelts Affidavit, 
exhibit "S". 111 November 1998, Rook Broadcasting conveyed the property to AGM-Nevada, 
L.L.C. Appeal Exhibit Weeks Affidavit, exhibit "T". In November 2000, AGM-Nevada, 
L.L.C. conveyed the property to Capstar. Appeal Exhibit Weelts Affidavit, exhibit "U". 
In 1992, Funk sold his remaining Section 22 property to John Mack. Appeal Exhibit 
Weelts Affidavit, exhibit "11". 
Arman and Mary Jane Farmanian executed the Meinoranduin of Sale Agreement with 
Lawrence on October 1, 1996. On September 20, 1996, i~urnediately prior to signing the 
Lawrence sale agreement, Arman and Mary Jane Farinanian entered into a luut~ial agreen~ent, 
grant of easement and quit claiin deed with John Mack collcerning their respective parcels. 
This agreement recited in relevant part that "AND WIIEREAS, MACI< and MAGIC'S 
predecessors in interest have used a preexisting private road traversing the n-~ost southeasterly 
portion of the FARMANIAN PROPERTY to gain access to the MACK PROPERTY. This 
private road is sometiil1es known as Blosso~n Mountain Road (hereinafter referred to as the 
"ACCESS ROAD"). For illustrative purposes only, the approximate location of t l ~ e  ACCESS 
ROAD is depicted as a double dashed line on the Exhibit B, attached liereto and incorporated 
herein by reference. Exhibit A is an enlargemeiit of the United States Geological Survey 
topograpliical map of the subject area." This agreement referred to the access road as the 
historic location of tlie access road in inore tlian one location. Appeal Exhibit Weelts Afildavit, 
exhibit "EE". The attached exiiibit "B" to the Farmaniail/Mack agreenlenl deed depicted the 
road using a similar U.S. Geological Survey map that Wyiin We~iker (Verizon Nortliwest) 
utilized to portray the GTC road as it existed in the Soiitheast Quarter of Section 21 across the 
Lawrence parcel and into Section 22 to the radio tower site. Appeal Exliibit Weeits Affidavit, 
Exhibit "F" (exhibit C to We~ilcer Affidavit). Thus, Farmanian and Mack recognized the GTC 
easement road as the historical access road being used by Funk and his successor, Maclt. 
Harold Funk testiiied i i i  his 2004 affidavit that when lie purchased tlie property, the 
easement road that was used to access the property was the same road over whic1.i GTC had a 
recorded access easement. R p. 034-047. Consistent with his ~ffidavit, Mr. Funk testified in 
his deposition in  August 2007 that tlie access road he used wliel~ first loolti~ig at tile property 
was the W E  (General Telephone and Electric) access road. R Vol. 11, p. 36 (Tr p. 18, L1. 10- 
13). There was one gate on the road. R Vol. 11, p. 361 (Tr p. 18, LI. 25; p. 19, L1. 1-1 1). Mr. 
Funlc and the realtor drove to the GTE facility using tlie access road. R Voi. 11, p. 361 (Tr p. 
19, Ll. 15-25; p. 20, Ll. 1-8.) When Mr. Funk passed over the property he didn't own he 
thoiight he a right to do so based upon the Mead easelne~it he obtained. Supp R Vol. 11, p. 370 
(Tr p. 53, L.2 5; p. 54). In the six year period before seili~ig the Lawrence parcel, Funk went to 
the property 20-30 t i~nes himself to target practice and pick huclcleberries. Supp R VoI. 11, p. 
363 (Tr. p. 25, LI. 11-25; p. 26, LI. 1-5). Funlc bought the property for investlnent purposes. 
Stipp R Voi. 11, p. 359 (Tr p. 12, L1. 15-17). 
When Funk visited the property, he used the GTE road and went to the GTE tower site. 
R Vol. 11, p. 370 ('rr. p. 53, L1. 1-24). Mr. Fui~lc considered ope~ling a road to tile east, but 
someone told him he couldn't do it. R Vol. 11, p. 371 (Tr. p. 58, Ll. 11-25; p. 59, Ll. 1-2). 
John Roolc, the president of Icootenai Broadcasting, 111c ("I<BIn), testified in his 2004 
affidavit that I<Bi purchased the Capstar parcel froin Funit to operate a wireless radio tower. 
Mr. Raoli indicated that f~~rt l ler  ast of the parcel were other tower parcels, including GTC. 
Rook testified that wheil KBI purchased the property, it used the saine easement road that 
corulected from the public road, Signal I'oini Road (identified oil tile map as "Slci Lodge 
Road"), to the GTC parcel. R pp. 026-033. 
In his deposition talcel1 August 2007, Mr. Rook indicated that he wanted to purchase a 
site at the to11 of Blossoin Mountain to upgrade a radio station identified as ICCDA. Sulsp R 
Vol. 11, p. 402 (Tr p. 9, 11. 11-24). Mr. Rook testified the purchase was in 1988 or 1989. Supp 
R Voi. Ii, p. 403 (Tr p. 10, 1,1. 19-25; 11. 1 1, Ll. 1-22). Whe11 Mr. Rook loolted at the property, 
there was only one road to the top of Blossotn Mountain, which was being used by CJTE to 
acces its parcel. Supp R Vol. IT, p. 404 (Tr p. 15, Ll. 18-23; p. 16, L. 25; p. 17, L1. 1-21). Mr. 
Rook recollected that there was one chail? link gate on the road and another gate positioll 
approximately one-half mile away, in the proximity of a sturdy fence, where a gate had once 
bee13 in place. Supp R Vol. 11, p. 406 (Tr p. 22, L1. 17-25; 11. 23, L1. 1-9; p. 24, Ll. 15-1 7). 
There were no signs on the access road identifying it. Mr. IZook referred to this road as the 
"mail1 road" and the GTE site was at the elid of the access road. Supp R Vol. 11, p. 412 (Tr p. 
48, LI. 19-25; p. 49, LI. -1-19). Travelers 011 the road were inoilitored by Wilbur Mead. Supp 
R Vol. 11, p. 406 (Tr p. 25, L1. 24-25; p. 26; p. 27, L1. 1-4). Although Mr. Rook could not 
identify the sectiolis through which the road passed, he coiifir~ned that Exhibit C to his &davit 
loolted lilte the configuralion of the road as he recalled it. Supp R Vol. 11, p. 417 (Tr p. 67, LI. 
17-25;p. 68,Ll. 1-13)p.418(Trp.  70,Ll. 13-25). 
In Mr. Roolc's deposition, Lawrerice's coulisel suggested there was another entry into 
the GTE site which was Melliclc Road. In response, Mr. Iioolc rejected this proposition, noting 
that he had once heard there was a goat's trail that was uilbelievabiy steep corning up the Post 
Fails side of the mountain that. couldi1't provide access even ill  good weather. Me never Itnew 
of any other road even though he loolted around for other access roads to the site because the 
access road they were usiiig was terribly bulnpy. Supp R Vol. 11, p. 413 (Tr p. 50, Ll. 12-25; p. 
51-52; p. 53, L1. 1-8; ) p. 415 (Tr p. 60, Ll. 7-23). GTE took KCDA's engineer up oil their 
Siiow Cat usiilg the same GTC access road during major snow storins. Supp R Vol. I1 p. 414 
(Tr p. 54, Ll. 9-22). 
During the tell years that I<CDA used the road, they regularly bumped into other people 
from the neighboring tower sites on the road and no one ever ti~entioi~ed an alter~lative access. 
Supp R Vol. 11, p. 416 (Tr p. 62, LI. 26-25; p 63, L1. 1-18). Mr. Rooit indicated that he had 
receiitly beeti to Spolca~ie and loolted up the side of Blossorn Mountain, and there were now 
roads on the mountain, but tiley were not there during his ownership of the Capstar parcel. 
Supp R Vol. 11, p. 50 (Tr . 50, Ll. 12-25; p. 51, LI. 1-5). 
KCDA received approval in 1991 or 1992 to broadcast fi-orn the Capstar parcel. Supp R 
Vol. 11, p. 409 (Tr p. 35, LI. 7-1 1). There was an engineer who went up to the site at least every 
two to three weelts to do maintenance and sometin~es every week. Supp R Vol. TI, p. 408 ('Tr p. 
32,T-1. 4-17; p. 38, LI. 23-25; p. 39, Ll. 1-2). ICCDA continued to broadcast until Mr. Rook 
(Rook Broadcasting) sold the tower in 1998 or 1998. Supp R Vol. 11, p. 410 (Tr p. 41, 1.,l. 10- 
22). Mr. Rook testified that the companies that he owned (ICBI and Rook Broadcasting) used 
the GTC road for the ten years they owned ICCDA. Supp R Vol. 11, p. 416 (Tr p. 62, L1. I I -  
25). Mr. Rook also leased tower space to Trinity Broadcasting the last five to seven years that 
his coinpany owned the tower site. Supp R Vol. 11, p. 416 (Tr p. 63, Ll. 19-25; p. 65, LI. 4-8; 
LI. 18-23). ICCDA operated concurrently with Trinity Broadcasting. Supls I? Vol. 11, p. 416 (Tr 
p. 65, LI. 18-23). 
Mr. Rooli also testified that during the years he owned the tower, "we used to pass 
people all the time on that road, somebody coming in or going out, they were working on this 
or that." Supp R Voi. 11, p. 418 (Tr p. 72, Ll. 18-20). Mr. Rook testified that they would pass 
someone else on the road "Fairly frequently", some of whom were with GTE . Supp R Voi. 11, 
p. 418 (Trp. 73, LI. 24-25) p. 419 (Tr p. 74, L1. 1-16). 
On the north face of Blosso111 Mountain (which is south of l'ost Falls, Idaho), there is a 
public road know11 as Mellick Road wllich was laid out by Viewer's Report in 1907. Appeal 
Exhibit Lawrence Affidavit, exhibit C. This road as laid out terininated in the Northeast 
Quarter of Section 21. The Mellicli Road right of way is within the jurisdiction of Post Falls 
Highway District and been maintained for a short distance into Section 15. Brownsberger 
Affidavit (augmented on appeal). 
On March 24, 2004, John Maclc prepared an affidavit in this matter which was 
subn~itted as an exhibit to Lawrence's affidavit in ol~position to tile original inotion for 
sulnnlary judgment in 2004. Appeal Exhibit L,awrence Affidavit, exhibit "L". Mr. Maclc 
testified that il l  1992 he purchased property in Section 22 from Funk. Mr. Mack testified that at 
the tinle he purcl~ased the property, he inquired aborrt access and the realtor told him he knew 
the way. Mr. Mack testified in the Spring of 1994, he was stopped by Idaho Forest Industries 
("IFI") and informed he did not have legal access across Section 28, and IF1 demanded he 
cease traveling across Section 28. Mr. Maclc testified his Section 22 property was landlocked 
as a result of this circumstance because there was no other access road to the Section 22 
property. Mr. Maclc indicated that as late as 1996, he was attempting to obtain easements to 
access the Funlc properly. Mr. Mack testified that ii l  2002, he purchased property from Fred 
Zuber in  the East half of the Northwest % of Section 22 (property never owned by Funk) to 
develop an access to the north of the Section 22 property. 
11. ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review 
The Court of Appeal recently reiterated tlie standard of review in a case to be tried to 
the court. I11 .Johnson v. McPhee, Idaho , P.3d - (Ct. App. 2009), tile court 
stated: 
On review of an order granting su l~~ i~ ia ry  judgment, this court uses the 
same legal standard as that used by the trial court. l;i.ieltJ. Boise City House. 
Al~rh., 126 Idaho 484,485, 887 P.2d 29, 30 (1994); Washington Fed. Sav. & 
Loan Ass'n v. Lash, 121 Idaho 128, 130, 823 P.2d 162, 164 (1 992). Su~~i i~ ia ry  
judgment may be entered oiily if "tlie pleadings, deposition, and admissions on 
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 110 genuine issue as to 
ally material fact a~ld  tliat the ~noving party is entitled to judgment as a lilatter of 
law." Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c). See also Avilu v. Wahlquisl, 126 
Idaho 745, 747,890 P.2d 33 1, 333 (1995); Idaho Bldg Conlraclors Ass 'n v. 
Ciry of Coez~r d'Alene, 126 Idaho 740, 742, 890 P.2d 326, 328 (1995). Wlien a 
suinliiary judgment lnotioil has been supported by depositioiis, affidavits or 
other evidence, tlie adverse party niay not rest upon the inere allegations or 
denials of tliat party's pleadings, but by affidavits or as otherwise provided iii 
the rule, illust set hr th  specific facts showing that there is a geuuine issue for 
trial. I.R.C.P. 56(e). See also Garher  v. Evans, 110 Idaho 925,929,719 P.2d 
1185, I1 89 (1986). In order to survive a rliotioil for suiuiliary judgllleilt the 
plaintiff need not prove that an issue will be decided in its favor at trial; rather, it 
must simply siiow that there is a triable issue. G & M Fari~is v, Funk Irrigation 
Co., 119 Idaho 514, 524, 808 P.2d 851, 861 (1991). A illere scilltilla of evidence 
or o11Iy a slight doubt as to the facts is insufficient to witlistai1d sunimary 
judgment; there must be s~rfficierit evidence up011 which a j~rry could reasonably 
return a verdict for the party opposing surnlilary judgment. Corbridge v. Clark 
Equip Co., 112 Idaho 85, 87, 730 P.2d 1005, 1007 ( 1  986); Pelricevich v. 
Salmon River Canal Co., 92 Idaho 865,871,452 P.2d 362,368 (1 969). 
When a court considers a nlotion for surnmary judgment i r i  a case that 
would be tried to ajury: all facts are to be liberally construed, aiid all reasonable 
inferences iiiust be drawl1 in favor oftiie party resisting the iiiotioi~. G & M 
Fari7is, I 19 Idaho at 517, 808 P.2d at 854; Sci17der.s 1). lltin~i .Joint School Disl., 
125 Idaho 872, 874, 876 P.2d 154, 156 (Ct. App. 1994). The rule is different 
however when, as here, a jury trial has not bee11 requested. In tliat event, because 
the couri would be the fact-finder at trial, on a suriililary judg~lleilt motion the 
court is elltitled to draw tlie i~iost probable inferences from tlie ulidisputed 
evideilce properly before it, and iiiay grant the summary judgment despite the 
possibility of coliflicti~lg infereiices. P.O. Ven~ures, Inc. v. Louclc,~ Fai7zily 
IrrevocaOle Trusr, 144 Idaho 233, 237, 159 P.3d 870, 874 (2007); Inrerinountain 
Forest Mgnzi., lnc. 1). L,ouisian.a Paciyc Corjl., 136 Idaho 233, 235, 3 1 P.3d 921. 
923 (2001); Broivn 12. Perkins, 129 Idaho 189, 191,923 1'.2d 434,436 (1996). 
Infereilces thus drawn by a trial court will not be disturbed on appeal if the 
record reasonably supports them. Shawver v. HucltleDerry E~states, L. L. C., 140 
Idaho 354,360-61,'); P.3d 685,691-92 (2004); lnternzozinlain Foresi Mgnzt., 
Inc., 136Idahoat236,31 P.3dat924. 
B. The District Court did not Err in Finding there was an Implied Easement 
In Akers 1). D.L. While Const., Inc., 142 Idaho 293, 127 P.3d 196 (2005), this Court 
held: 
A party seelting to establish ail inyslied easement 1.0111 prior use "must 
demonstrate three essential elements: (1) unity of title or ownership and 
subseque~lt separation by grant of tlie doininant estate; (2) apparent contilluous 
use long enough before separation of the dominant estate to show that the use 
was intended to be permanent; and (3) the easement must be reasoilably 
necessary to the proper enjoyment ofthe doiniila~lt estate." Davis, 133 Idaho at 
642, 991 P.2d at 367. 
Creation of easements by implication rests upon exceptioils to the rule that written 
iilstrumeilts speak for thei~~selves, and because i~liplied easeivents are contrary to that rule, the 
courts disfavor them. Sutton v. Brown, 91 Idaho 396,400,422 P.2d 63, 67 (1966); Cord~)ell  v.
Smith, 105 Idaho 71,77,665 P.2d 1081, 1087 (Ct. App. 1983). An easement is iirlplied because 
i t  is presuined that if an access was in use at the tiille of severance i t  was meant to continiie 
Bob Dai?iels undSons v. Weaver: 105 Idaho 535,  542, 681 P.2d 1010, 101 7 (C1. App. 1984). 
Easeillents by inlplication rest on the view that land should not be re~~dered unfit for use due to 
a lack of access. Id. 
Apparent co~lti~luous e refers to the use before the separation of the parcels that would 
indicate the roadway was intended to provide permanent access to tile parcels. Cordwell, 105 
Idaho at 78,665 P.2d at 1088. The party seelting to establish the easement has the burden of 
providing the facts to establish the easement. I d ,  105 Idaho at 77, 665 P.2d at 1087. 111 Davis v. 
Peacoclc, 133 Idaho 637,641-42, 991 P.2d 362, 366-67 (1999), this Court held that successors 
in interest to the original grantors of property could assert easement rights by implied or prior 
use 
Strict necessity is not required for the creation of an implied easement by prior use. All 
that is required is reasonable necessity. Davis v. Peacock, 133 Idaho 637, 991 P.2d 362 (1999); 
Thomas v Mudsen, 142 Idaho 635, 132 P.3d 392 (2006). IZeasonable necessity is something 
less tila11 the great present necessity required for a11 easement iniplied by necessity. Davis, 133 
Idaho at 642. Furthermore, the easement by iinplication is not extinguished if the easement no 
longer exists or is no longer reasonably necessary. Id. at 643. This Court noted in Davis: 
This long standing rule is based on the theory that when sonleone 
conveys property, they also intend to couvey whatever is required for the 
beneficial use and enjoyment of that property, and in t e~~ds  to retain all that is 
required for the use and enjoy~nent of tile land retained. Coilsequeiltly, an 
easeineilt implied by prior use is a true easement of a permanent duration, rather 
than a temporary easement which exists only as long as the necessity continues. 
See, e.g., Norken. v. McGnhan, 823 P.2d 622,631 (Alaslta 1991); Thon?pson v. 
Schuh, 286 Or. 201, 593 P.2d 1138, 1145 (1979); Slorj) I J .  FIefi~ei,, 540 P.2d 562, 
566 (Oltla.1975). Additionally, all iniplied easement by prior use is appurtenant 
to the land and therefore passes with all subsequent conveyances of the 
doillinant and servient estates. See i-Juglies 11. Slnre, 80 Idaho 286, 328 P.2d 397 
(1958); I.C. S: 55-603 (staling that a transfer of real property also includes all 
easements attached to the property). 
1) Unily of Title 
Lawrence contends that the GTC road passed through Section 28, and since Funk never 
had title to Section 28, Capstar can not establish the unity &title necessary for an implied 
easement. Capstar does not seek to establish in this suit an implied easement over Section 28. 
This argument is not relevant to tlie issues before the trial court. 
Lawrence also contends the district court erred in finding that Capstar l~ad  an implied 
easement because Capstar's parcel was still a part of Funk's Section 22 parcel at the time of 
separation of the Lawrence parcel. However, a transfer of real property i~lcludes all easements 
appurtenant, including implied easements. Davis v. Peacoclc, 133 Idaho 637, 643, 991 P.2d 
362 (1999), I.C. 5 55-603. Thus, the trial court did not err when it held Cpastar had an implied 
easemeilt arising from the 1975 severance. 
2) A p ~ ~ u ~ m /  Coniinuou~ Use 
Lawrence contends on appeal that the trial court erred when it found that tlie facts 
presented a1 summary judgment established apparent continuous use long enough before 
separation of the doillinant estate to show that the use was intended to be permanent. Lawrence 
argues on appeal that Funlts deposition testiinony established that Fulllc only used a portion of 
Blossom Mouiltain Road to access land owned by Funk lying in the Southwest Quarter ofthe 
Southeast Quarter of Section 2 1 .  
In actuality, Funk's affidavit and deposition testimony were clear that Funk used the 
existiug GTC road to access his property in Section 22 and that he drove to GTE's tower site in 
Sectior~ 22 when he used the road to access his property, illcluding passing through Sectioil 28 
to get to the top of Blossom Mountain. R Vol. 11, p. 369 (Tr p 52); p. 370 ('Tr p. 53). However, 
there was a discrepancy at Mr. Funk's deposition regarding the location of Blossom Mountain 
as compared to the map exhibits being provided Mr. Funli during his deposition. Mr. Funk 
indicated to Lawre~~ce's counsel that the nlap he was being shown (Exhibit I )  was different 
than his recollection of the road and it wasn't drawn right, and tllar the rnotintGn (Blossom 
Moiintain) was "up here" and had the tower site. Lawrence's coiinse! response Lo this concern 
about the top of the mountain being "up here" was, "Yeah, you owned some land in 22, sure. 
Yeah, oltay." Supp R Vol. 11, p. 368 (Tr p. 45, L1. 7-25; p. 46, L1. 1-14). Later, 1,awrence's 
counsei presented an eularged portion of the tilap that Mr. l'unli had indicated was not drawn 
right. In aslcing questions about the road, Lawrence's couiisel prefaced his statements with a 
representation that Blossom Mountain was in Section 21. Supp R Vol. 11, p. 369 (Tr p. 49, LI. 
18-15, p. 50, LI. 1-4). Nonetheless, Mr. Funk's deposition testiniony was clear and co~~siste~lt  
that he used the GTC road to drive to GTE's tower site to access his property in Section 22. 
This matter was to be tried to the trial court. As sucli, tile trial court was allowed to 
draw probable inferences from the undisputed facts before it. Lawrence s~~bnl i t s  that the trial 
court erred in drawing the probable inference tl~at Mr, Fiunk used the GTC road to access his 
Section 22 property. The undisputed fact before tile trial court was that Mr. Funk used the 
GTC road and traveled i t  to its ternlinus at GTE's tower site on several occasions to access his 
property in Section 22. The probable inference given Mr. Fnnk's columents at deposition 
regarding the inaccuracy of the maps and adoption of two different nlaps as accurately 
depicting the road he used, in conibination with his unwaivering testimony that he used tlie 
GTC road to travel to the GTE site was he used the GTC road for access to his property in 
Section 22. Thus, the trial court's ruling that there was continuous use prior to separation was 
supported by substantial evidence, including the probable inference the trial court drew froin 
the evidence provided by Mr. Funk. 
Finally, Lawrence argues the trial court coinnlitted error because it did not find the 
probable inference draw an inference in their favor from the evidence presented that Funlc's use 
was l~ardly enough for anyone to notice. In support of this claim, Lawrence directs this Court 
to a statement from Wilbur Mead illat to his Itnowledge, Funlt did not use the gate on the road 
as i t  crossed his property in the Southwest Quarter of Section 21 between 1966 and 1972. 
Additionally, Lawrence argues Funk sold to a Minnesota corporation that would hardly have 
ltnowledge of Funlc's use. Lawrence also contends that the fact that after the sale to Fluman 
Synergistics, Funk relocated to Aberdeen and didn't use the road after 1981 is significant. 
Tile events that occurred after the sale to I-t~nlian Synergistic were immaterial to the trial 
court's inquiry regarding the use o'tlie access prior to the severance. The only fact that was 
relevant was Mr. Mead's statement that lo  hi.^ kno~~ ledge  F L I I ~ ~  did not use the gate on his 
property. I-Iowever, this fact does not directly contradict Funk's testi~ilony that he did use it. It 
was merely a scintilla of evidence that neither contradicted nor directly disputed Funlc's 
testimony. Thus, the trial court did not err in finding that the undisputed facts it had before, 
includiiig Funk's testimony; the Farii~anian grant of easement to Mack in 1996 recognizing the 
access road as the historical access to the site; the I-Iunlan Syl~ergistics Sales Agreeinent 
(Lawrence's predecessor) wl~ich indicated that the existing ingresslegress road was the access 
to tlie Section 22 property retained by Funk; and tlie use of the road which was consistent with 
the use and location of tlie property, established ilpparent co11tinuous use. Supp R Vol. 111, pp. 
561-565. 
3) Reusonable Necessily 
Lawre~lce argues that the district court erred iii finding there was reasoilable necessity 
for the easement at the time of severance of their parcel. Lawrence maintains that tile 
undisputed facts in the record demonstrate that Mellick Road extended to the Funk property in 
Section 15. 111 footnote 15, Lawrence contends that F~unk identified a loggiilg road fro111 
Section 22 to Mellick Road in Sectio11 15. Tl~us, I.,awrence co~icludes that there was access to 
the Section 22 property at the time FLIIII< purcliase Sectio11 22 by connecting the logging road 
from Section 22 illto Section 15. 
The following is an illustrative depiction of the properties in questio~i utilizing a 
Kooteiiai Couilty 11ublic road map f om the Brownsberger affidavit.. The properties Fuillts 
originally acquired are higlilighted in yellow. The red x's on the luap illustrate the approximate 
locatioii of Melliclt Road (along the creek) as laid out by the Viewer's Report for Mellick 
Road. 
In his deposition, Mr. Funk testified that there was a logging road in poor shape on the 
east side of Blossom Mountain. Contrary to the claims of Lawrence to the contrary, the facts 
in the record show that the logging road was not open all the way to Mellicic Road at the time 
Funk purchased Section 22, and crossed property not owned by Funlc. Supp R Vol. 11, p. 371 ( 
Tr 61, Li. 8-25; p. 62; p. 63,l-1. 1-1 5). The Exhibit provided Mr. Funlc during his deposition 
portrayed a road going through the Southwest Quarter of Section 22, ~ n t o  the Northwest 
Quarter of Section of22, and crossing over into the Northeast Quarter of Section 21 (in areas 
not enconlpassed in the Viewer's Report of the Mellick Road pi~blic right of way) and back into 
Section 15. Therefore, the portion of the road depicted in Exhibit I to Funk's deposition laying 
in the Southeast Qt~arter of t l ~ e  Northeast Quarter of Section 21 was not on property o\vned by 
Funk. Mr. Funk further testified that this road was in poor shape. Supp R Vol. 11, p. 360 (Tr p. 
15, LI. 6-25; p. 16, Ll. 1-6). Mr. Funk testified contemplated talting a bulldozer and opening up 
the logging road but did not pursue this idea because another property owner told him he 
couldn't do that. Supp R Vol. 11, p. 371 (Tr p. 58, Ll. 1 1  -25; 12. 59, L1. 1-6). 
Further, the trial court's finding that Mellicli Road did not provide access ill 1975 was 
corroborated by John Mack's testimony (provided by Lawrence) that there was no alternate 
access road existing at the time of his purchase of the Funk Sectio~i property in 1992. The trial 
court did not en. when it found fi-om these u~~disputed facts that the use of the access road was 
reasonably necessary at the time Funlc severed the Lawrence parcel. 
Mr. Funlc testified the GTC road was the oilly road that provided access to Section 22. 
Mellicli Road as laid out on the Viewer's report teriuinated in the Northeast Quarter of the 
Northeast Quarter (approximately) of Section 21 Thus, the undisputed facts before the trial 
court were that Mellick Road did not provide access to Funk's Section 22 property at the time 
he purchased; nor did the logging road provide access, nor did Funk have the right to extend tlie 
logging road to connect to the public riglit of way across property lie did not own. To reach the 
coi~clusion Lawrences urge, Funk would had to have bulldozed the road to open it; crossed 
property that wasn't owlied by Funk and over wliicli Funk had been told he better not do it. 
Lawrence iucluded an argument on appeal that Fui?k never showed the Capstar parcel to 
Mr. Rook in 198land that Mr. Rook could not identify whose land tile road crossed. These 
arguments are irrelevant to the issue of reasonable necessity at tlie time of severance of the 
Lawrence parcel in 1975 
Further, the trial court's finding that Meliick Road did not provide access in 1975 was 
supported by John Mack's testimony that there was no alternate access existing at the time of 
his purchase of the Firnlc Section property in 1992. The trial court did not err when it foui~d 
kern these undisputed facts that use of the access road was reasoi1abiy necessary at the tiliie 
Ful~k severed the Lawrence parcel 
C. Tlie Trial Court did not err in Pinding an Easement by Necessity 
An easernelit by necessity has some similar elements to an easement by prior use. The 
Court in B&,I Development & Inv., Inc. 11. Pnrsons, 126 Idaho 504, 887 P.2d 49 (Ct.App. 1994) 
rioted: 
To establish ail easement by necessity, the clailliant luust prove the followiiig 
elements: (1) tliat the do~iiinaiit parcel and the servieiit parcel were once part of a 
larger tract under comliio~i ownership; (2) tliat the necessity for the easement 
claimed over the servient estate enisred ni ihe time qflhe severcmce; and (3 )  the 
present necessity For the claimed easement is great. MucCaskill v. Ebbert, 112 
Idaho 11 15, 11 18,739 P.2d 414,417 (Ct.App. 1987) (emphasis added). Ail 
easelnelit by necessity is a creature of public policy. Boil Daniels (i: Sons v. 
Weaver, 106 Idalio 535, 543, 681 1'.2d 1010,1018 (CtApp. 1984). Therefore, the 
easement does not depend on an express mutual agreement. Rather, it arises, 
and will be recognized, when the three required elelueiits have been established. 
Establishn~ent of an easement by necessity is not defeated by a contrary 
expectation harbored by one of tlie parties. MacCasIcill, 1 12 Idaho at I1 19, 739 
P.2d at 418. It is a question of law. An owner of property, however, cannot 
create the necessity by his or her own actions. C a r d ~ ~ e l l  v. Sinith, 105 Idaho 71, 
80,665 P.2d 108 1, 1090 (Ct.App. 1983). 
Lawrence argues the trial coui? erred in determining that there was an easement by 
necessity. Lawrence concludes Funk argues beca~~se  Funk did not have a recorded easement 
across Section 28 that they had no legal access to the county road, and therefore the trial court 
could 1101 grant an easement by necessity, 
In Hughes 11. Fishei-, 142 Idaho 474, 129 P.3d 1223, 1231-1232 (2006) i t  was stated: 
This Court has quoted with approval tlie following analysis of the theory 
behind easements by necessity: 
A way of necessity is an easement arising fro111 an implied grant or 
implied reservation; it is of common-law origin and is supported by the rule of 
sound public policy that lands should not be rendered unfit for occupancy or 
s~~ccessful cultivation .... It is a universally established principle that where a 
tract of land is coiiveyed wliicl~ is separated from the liigliway by other lands of 
the grantor or surrounded by his lands or by his and those oF third persons, there 
arises, by implication, in favor of the grantee, a way of necessity across the 
premises of the grantor to the highway. Burley Brick and Sand Co. v. Cqfer, 
102 Idaho 333, 335, 629 P.2d 1166, 1 168 (1 981) (qtloting 17A Anz..lur. 
Ensei~zents j' 58 (1957)); see 25 An?../z~r.Zd Eosentenls nnd Licenses jS30-31 
(2005). 
One who clainls an easement by necessity across another's land iilust 
prove "(I) unity of title and subsequent separation oftlie dominant and servient 
estates; (2) necessity of the easement at the time of severance; and (3) great 
present necessity for the easement." Bear Islund Wciier Ass'n, Inc. 1~. Broi.l~n, 125 
Idaho 717,725, 874 P.2d 528, 536 (1994). 
The fact that there is a third party (the Section 28 owner) between Capstar and the public 
highway is of no significance to Capstar's right to seek an easement by necessity. 
Lawrence also co~ltends that Funk created his own necessity by failing to recognize, 
develop and utilize Mellick Road during the time he owned Section 22 prior to transferring it to 
Capstar's predecessor. This argument is the same argument Lawrence made regarding the 
reasonable necessity ele~nellt for an easement by implication. Again, there was no evidence in 
the record that Mellick Road provided access to Funk's Section 22 parcel or that Funk had a 
right to open a road across property he did not own. Thus, the necessity for the easement 
claimed over the Lawrence parcel existed at the time of the severance. 
As to great present ilecessity, Lawreilce does not contend that there is a rriaterial dispute 
of fact regarding this element, or that the trial court drew an improbable inference. Rather, they 
argue that the trial court erred as a matter of law in failing to recognize that Capstar created its 
own necessity for an easement through the actions of its predecessor. Lawrence claiins that 
Funk chose not to develop an access route down to Mellicic Road (across property he did not 
own) that Capstar can't claim a great present ilecessity. This is yet another arguruent that the 
~lecessity did not exist at the time of severance. It does not present this Court with any facts 
that there is not great present necessity for the road. In fact, Lawrence presented the trial court 
evidence to the contrary in Mr. Mack's afidavit. That affidavit ackilowledged when he 
purchased in 1996 tilere was no access, and to obtain access to Mellicic road, he had to purchase 
it and develop it through a neighboring property in Sectioil 22. Capstar has no legal right to 
travel over Mack's private road. Thus, i t  has great present i~ecessity for the easement. 
D. The Trial Court did not Err in Determining there was an Easement by 
Prescriptio~~ 
Tile standards for estahlisl?ment of a prescriptive easement were reiterated in Akers, 
supra at 206, as follows: 
A party seeking to establish the existence of an easement by prescription "must 
prove by clear and convincing evidence use of tile subject property, whicll is 
characterized as: ( I )  open and notorious; (2) continuous and uninterrupted; (3) 
adverse and under a claim of right; (4) with the actual or intputed knowledge of 
the owner of the servient tene~nent (5) for the statutory period." I1Todgii?s, 139 
Idaho at 229, 76 P.3d at 973. The statutory period in question is five years. I.C. 5 
5-203; Weaver, 134 Idaho at 698, 8 P.3d at 1241. A claiina~lt may rely on his 
own use, or he "may rely oil the adverse use by the claimant's predecessor for 
the prescriptive period, or the claima~~t ntay cornhine such predecessor's use wit11 
the claimant's own use to establish the requisite five contii~uous years of adverse 
use." hod gin.^, 139 Idaho at 230, 76 P.3d at 974. Once the claimant presents 
proof of open, notorious, continuous, uninterriipted use of the clainled right for 
tile prescriptive period, even without evidence of how the use began, he raises 
the presumption that the use was adverse and under a claim of right. Wood v. 
Hoglund, 131 Idaho 700, 702-03,963 1'.2d 383, 385-86 (1998); Mcrrshc~ll v. 
Blair, 130 Idalto 675,680, 946 P.2d 975, 980 (1997). Tlte burden then shifts to 
the owner of the servient tenement to show that the claimant's use was 
permissive, or by virtue of a license, contract, or agreeineitt. Wood, I31 Idaho at 
703, 963 P.2d at 386; A4mshall, 130 Idaho at 680, 946 P.2d at 980. The nature of 
the use is adverse if "it runs contrary lo tile servient owner's claims to the 
property." ITodgins, 139 Idaho at 23 1, 76 P.3d at 975. The state of mind of rite 
users of tile alleged easement is not c o ~ ~ t r o i l i ~ ~ g ;  the focus is on the nature of 
their use. Id. at 231-32, 76 1'.3d at 975-76. 
Lawrence correctly notes that the trial court made an error in its ruling regarding the 
prescriptive period as applied to Fiink. The trial court correctly noted that in loolting at the 
prescriptive period it was required to examine the six year period following Funli's sale ofthe 
Lawrence parcel to I-I~iman Synergistics. Funk owned the entire parcel for a six year period 
from 1969 to 1975. After selling theLawrence parcel, he personally used the road from 1975 
to 198 1, another six year period. The trial court discussed the six year prescriptive period as 
being from 1969 to 1975. It is clear the trial court became confused regarding the years 
encompassed in the six year prescriptive use period. The evidence in the record before the trial 
court was that after 17ioving to Aberdeeil in 1975, Funlt only visited the property two or three 
times and stopped visiting a f e r  198 I or 1982 when lie was diagnosed with cancer. 
However, this defect in tlic Court's analysis regarding tlie time period of I2uiik's use 
does not invalidate the trial court's finding that there was a lsrescriptivc easement established 
over the property. The trial court held the undisputed facts establislied tliat Funk's successors 
used the road openly, continuously, without interruption, under a claim of right much longer 
than the statutory period required. Supp R Vol. 111, p. 576. 
Lawrcilce argued to the trial court tliat the undisputed facts established that Capstar's 
use ofthe access road was based upon permission they granted. Supp R Vol. 111, p. 571. 
Relying on Alcers v. D. L. White, supra, the trial court also correctly held that tlie only period of 
time for which Lawrence could give permission was the period of tiine during their ownersliip, 
which commenced in 1996. The Court rejected this argument, noting that Lawrence submitted 
an affidavit that since talting title to the land, he iiiai~itai~ied a loclted gate on his property, 
stopped and turned back people who~ii lie deemed could not demonstrate a legal right to use the 
road, and actively attempted to engage the sheriff uffice to get their support in limiting use of 
the road. Supp R Vol. 111, p. 572.* Lawrence argues that the trial court erred as a matter of law 
in fiiidiilg tliat Fuiilc and its successors use of the road was not permissive. Lawrelice raises two 
Tile affidavit referenced by tile Lsial coi~rl is in llie record at Supp R Voi. I ,  pp. 146-293 
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theories in support of this contention. Lawrence contends the trial court should have 
determined that the use was permissive hased upon the fact that there was common use with the 
owner of the servieut estate and based upon the fact that Lawrence's parcel was wild, 
u~lenclosed or unimproved. Lawrence did not raise the wild, unellclosed or uninlproved 
theory below, and should not he allowed to raise it on appeal. Further, Lawrence cites to no 
facts in the record to support this contention. 
Lawrence argues on appeal that the trial coul.t erred by failing to rule it was entitled to a 
presumption that Capstar's use was permissive based upon public use. I11 support of this 
argument, Lawrence cites to Marshall v. Bluir, 130 Idaho 675,679, 946 P.2d 975,979 (1997). 
The Marshull court held tl~at when the origin of use of an easeiuent is ~~nl<nown, there is a 
presumption of adverse use. The servient estate can rebut this presuiinption by presenting 
evidence of general public use. 
The origin of the use of this easement is Icnown. It coii?menced on purchase of the Funk 
property and continued after severance. Even if Lawrence were correct, the trial court held that 
the undisputed facts established Funli's use was not permissive. The trial court correctly noted 
that after Flunk sold the property to Human Synesgistics in 1975, lie recorded the sales 
oress easement agreement which contained the clause that the parcel was subject to an ingressle, 
for the benefit of Section 22. Even though this language did not reserve an express easement, it 
evidenced a claim of right for Flu~k and their successors to use the road for ingress and egress 
to Section 22, and was recorded in the real property records. The trial court co~lcluded that this 
document established that the use of tlie ease~ne~it by Funk and his successors was under a 
claim of right. 
Even if these facts allowed rebuttal of the of the evidence, the record is devoid of any 
facts presented by Lawrence that the easement is used by the general public. To the contrary, 
Mr. Lawrence's affidavit testimony was that he loclced the gate on the road on his property and 
did not allow the public to use it. It was also uildisputed that the access road was gated and 
loclted as it crossed Wilbur Mead's property arid keys were given to Funk and Roolc to use the 
road. These undispi~ted facts show the road was not used by the general p~~b l i c .  
Lawrence asserts that the trial court co~n~nitted error when it did not draw ail iuference 
of permissive use from the fact that Wilbur Mead's gate in the Southwest Quarter of Section 21 
was loclted and keys were provided to Funk and Rook. Funlt had an easement across Mead's 
property. Mead did not impede this right, even though he used a gate and lock to impede others 
horn using the access road. A legal right is not a permissive right. Tile trial court did not err 
when it did not draw an iiifereiice that a legal right was a permissive right. 
Lawrence cite to Hughes v. Fisher, 124 Idaho 474, 129 P.3d 1223 (2006) ibr the 
proposition that there is no prescriptive use in tlie present case. 111 Hughes 1). Fisher, the court 
reiterated the general 1.u1e that the regular crossing of another's property was pxesurued to be 
adverse with the exception where a landowner constructed a way over tlie lalid for his own use 
and convenieilce, the mere use of it by others that doesn't interfere with his use will be 
presumed per~nissive. 
In this case, there is no evidence that Lawrence or his predecessor constructed the road. 
In the present case, tilere is evidence that the road existed at least around 1967 when GTE 
prepared a road profile of it. It certainly existed when Funk started using it, and it existed when 
Roolc started using it Thus, the trial court had no basis to presume that the use by Funlcs and 
others has been pcrn~issive. Lawrence did not present evidence in support of its laches claim 
sufficient to prevent entry of sunnnary judgment. 
E. The Trial Court did not Err in Rejecting Defendants' Laches and Statute of 
Limitation Claims 
Defendant argues on appeal that Capstar was required in its conlplaint to allege that it 
would be relying upon easement rights established by its predecessors in iiiterest in order to 
proceed with its suit. Lawrence presents no case law or argument why this statement supports 
a claim of laches. Further, as pointed out by the trial court, Capstar's complaint did allege 
Capstar and its predecessors in title had used Blossoin Mou~ltain Road as it crossed the 
Defendants' real property for access to Capstar's real properly openly, notoriously, 
continuously, adversely and under claim of right for a period exceedi~zg five (5) years. Supp R 
Vol. 111, p. 578. 
Lawrence also cl~allenges the trial court's finding that there was no evidence in the 
record that the doctrine of laches sl~ould not apply. 011 appeal, Lawrence claiins tliey were 
prejudiced because the severance occurred nearly 33 years ago without any filrther explanation 
or argiin~ent. This argument was not presented to the trial court. Further, the facts on appeal 
show that Lawrence had an opportunity to depose botli Funk and Rook. It is difficult to 
ascertain the prejudice Lawrence claiiiis to have suffered. Further, Lawrence acltnowledges in 
its brief on appeal that the catalyst for the prcsent suit occurred when Lawrence began bioclting 
the road. Thus, Capstar had no need to defend its legal rights until Lawrence hloclted its use of 
the access road. 
Althougl~ contailled in its caption, Lawrciice did not present argiinient on the statute of 
li~nitation defense. This Court has consistently indicated it will not consider assignments of 
error not supported by argument and authority in the opening brief. Jorgen.son v. Coppedge, 
-Idaho -, 181 P.3d 450 (2008). 
F. The Trial Court did not Err in Striking Portions of Lawrence's Affidavits 
Lawrence contends the trial court erred in strilting portions of their affidavits while 
leaving intact those affidavits subnlitted by Capstar. This allegation is not correct. The trial 
court did strilte portions of Capstar's affidavit. Supp R Vol. 111, p. 349-351. 
Deslsite this general co~nplaint regarding the anlount of illaterial submitted and stricken, 
Lawrence presents no case law or argument why thc trial court abiised its discretion Again, 
this Court should not consider this iss~ic on appeal absent being presented argument and legal 
authority. 
G. The Trial Court did not Cotnmit Error in Granting a Sixth Access to its Parcel 
Pursuant to a previously entered order, the trial court entered an order allowing Capstar 
a sixth access to its parccl. In a preliminary injunction order entered at the outset of this case in 
2002, the trial court granted Capstar four accesses to its property, and required all future 
accesses be approved through application to the court. 011 October 29,2007, Capstar filed an 
application for a sixth access pursuant to the Court's previously entered order. 
Lawrence claims it was error for the court to allow the sixth access pursuant to the 
previously entered order. Without any cite to law, Lawreilce argues that because a perinalleilt 
i~ijuilctioil was entered at the concl~~s io i~s  of the first summary judgment on express easement, 
it nullified the preliminary i~ijuilction order. There simply is no case aw presented in support of 
this argumeilt. 
Lawrence clailiis the court should have required a bond. In Miller v. Board of Trustees, 
132 Idaho 244,247-48,970 P.2d 512, 5 15-16 (1998), this Court held that a bond is required 
unless the trial court maltes a specific finding based upon competent evidence that 110 such 
costs, damages or attorney fees will result to the restrained party as a result o f a  wro~lgful 
issiiing of the i~~,juiiction or restraining order. The trial court made such an order based upon 
the facts of the case. Supp Tr pp. 153, L. 25; 154- 155; 156, L. 1-23 
EI. The Trial Court Properly Considered and Ruled Upon Lawrence's Motion to 
Disqualify for Cause 
Lawrence devotes a large portioii of his brief to the argument that the district judge 
should have disqualified himself. Lawrence claims the trial court's imparistality could 
reaso~lably be questioned. 
111 support of this argumeiit, Lawrence claims tliat over the course of the litigation, they 
perceive the judge disregarded meritorious argumellts made by them. They also cite to the fact 
that the judge disqualified himself without cause in a former case involvillg their legal co~msel 
at the time (John Whelan). 
Lawrence also argues that the fact that the court took the motion under advisement and 
then issued a written opinion was a clear indicator that the court was no longer impartial and 
had a stalte ill the proceedings. 
Lawrence also talces umbrage with rulings with which it disagrees in this case and the 
case with Tower Asset. Lawrence claims that r~~l ings  favorable to Capstar deinonstrate that the 
district judge is "just a tool of these corporations." 
Finally, Lawrence claims that the evidentiary rulings inade on motions to strilce display 
the district judge's prejudice against tl.ie~n. I-Iowever, as noted above, Lawrence cite to no 
evidentiary rule of case in support of the claim that the trial court committed error in striking 
portions of their submitted affidavits. On suinniary judgment, a trial court is only allowed to 
consider admissible evidence. Posey v. Ford Molor Credit Co., 11 1 P.3d 162 (Idaho Ct.App. 
2005). 
The trial court issued a thorough opinion that enunciated its reasons for denying 
Lawrence's  notion for disqualification for cause. Supp R Vol. 11, p. 66-91. This meinoranduln 
sets forth the reasons the trial court refused the motion and clearly addresses the concerns 
raised by Lawrence on appeal. Lawrence has raised nothing on appeal that was not addressed 
in the trial court's decision except for the evidentiary rulings. Further, the evidentiary rulings 
made by the trial court were supported by the rules of evidence. 
Lawrence requests attorney fees on appeal because they perceive Capstar to be part of a 
large corporate conglomerate. This request does not comport with LA.R. 41. Lawrence does 
state that Capstar was not justified in pursuing summary judgment. To the extent that this 
could be deemed a claim for attorney fees pursuant to LC. 12-121, Capstar has not pursued tits 
defense of this appeal frivolously. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
SUBMITTED this 5" day of May, 2009. 
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A. 
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